This is the first in a three-part series on Burma.
On 7 November 2010 I was watching the first Burmese general election since 1990 from the Thai border town of Mae Sot. I was there to work as a volunteer with Burmese migrant women, mainly teaching English, political science and human rights.
However, for one week during the election I assisted the organization Burma
Partnership with electoral monitoring and the development of an election
tracker, mapping reports of various incidents such as vote buying,
voter intimidation, violence, etc., mainly on the part of the Union Solidarity
Development Party (USDP), the junta-backed political party. International
election monitors had been barred
from the country, but we received phone calls and eye witness accounts from
inside Burma.
At the end of our project our map of Burma was full of pins
dropped to indicate various abuses during the election. One voter
in Shan State reported that:
“Although we don’t like the USDP, all the villagers including me voted for the USDP since we were ordered by the town authorities to vote for the USDP. We were afraid while we were voting since the authorities were watching on us at the polling station, to see if we were voting for them or not.”
It came as no surprise that the junta’s USDP won the
election. The National League of Democracy (NDL) led by Aung San Suu Kyi,
decided not to participate and few other parties had the experience or enough
time to prepare to lead successful campaigns. This combined with the high
levels of irregularities during the election.
What was surprising,
however, was the international community’s reaction. While many expressed
concern over irregularities, the response was widely positive – Burma seemed to
be lauded for even holding a general election at all. The government received
even more praise when they released Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest on 13
November (Aung San Suu Kyi spent almost 15 years in house arrest between 1988
and 2010).
In the months following the election prime ministers and
business leaders from all over the world visited Burma in a bid to gain
influence, and receive profitable contracts no doubt, over the
‘democratization’ of the new and open Burma. Even the well-respected International
Crisis Group jumped on the over-enthusiastic bandwagon, claiming that
‘rapid and significant change has taken place in Myanmar in recent months’ and
that now was ‘not the time for the West to remain disengaged and sceptical.’ The Burmese government went from being an international pariah to
acceptable partner in the blink of an eye.
For us in the human rights advocacy community all this
elation and celebration of a new and democratic Burma seemed very premature.
Armed conflict raged, and still does, in the country and it was difficult to
imagine how a country that had been a dictatorship since 1962 could become
democratic that fast. Indeed, even Aung
San Suu Kyi warned against the ‘reckless
optimism’ about Burma’s reforms and instead encouraged a healthy dose of ‘cautious
optimism’.
Now were are here, five years later, and facing another
general election in just about two months, on 8 November, which the government
has promised will be free
and fair. While I don’t want to be a
pessimist, several things make the context of these elections problematic
already.
First of all, even if the election itself this time is free
and fair, the Burmese
constitution poses some serious problems. The constitution reserves 25%
of the seats of both the lower and the upper house of Burma’s parliament for
the military. These representatives will be handpicked by the army and will
thus represent and be accountable to the army, not the Burmese people (article
109 and 141). The constitution also bars anyone whose spouse or children are
citizens of a foreign country from becoming president (article 59(f)). It
doesn’t take much to see who the drafters had in mind here…
Second, the armed
conflict in Burma, which has been going on for over forty years, is still
going on between government forces (the infamous Tatmadaw) and various ethnic
groups. The government has for years tried to broker a peace deal, but ethnic armed
groups have continued to doubts the government’s genuineness as the government
for a long time insisted on signing separate deals with each ethnic group
rather than one comprehensive peace deal – something seen as the old ‘divide
and rule’ tactic.
Currently, negotiations
are taking place between the government and fifteen different groups (six
armed groups not recognized by the government have been excluded). A tentative agreement
to sign a ceasefire next month was reached on 9 September. However, as
previous such agreements have fallen through we’ll just have to wait and see
and hope for the best. Meanwhile the
Tatmadaw continues to fight ethnic groups, primarily in Shan
State and Kachin States.
Third, the situation
of the Rohingya brings serious doubts to the legitimacy of the upcoming
election. Burma is home of over one million Rohingya, a mainly Muslim
ethnic group who lives mainly in Rakhine/Arakan state in western Burma on the
border with Bangladesh. The Rohingya are one of the most persecuted people in
the world according to the UN and are not even recognized in Burma by their own
name. Instead they are often called ‘Bengali’ in an effort to deny their
historical existence in Burma and their claim to citizenship, despite the fact
that the Rohingya have lived on the territory of what is now Burma for
centuries. In fact, the government
stripped the Rohingya of citizenship rights in 1982, leaving them stateless.
Since anti-Rohingya violence (which later turned into wide spread anti-Muslim
violence) broke out in 2010, hundreds of
thousands have been displaced and are living in squalor in camps – not allowed
to leave, for their ‘own protection’ according to the government.
Before the election in 2010 the government had issued temporary
‘white card’ identity documents to some 700,000 Rohingya, allowing them to
take part in the vote. However, despite promises that card holders would also
be allowed to vote in this election, the when
the government published the voting lists in Rakhine/Arakan state, no Rohinya
were on these lists. The ruling USDP
party even barred
its own Rohingya MP Shwe Maung from running in the upcoming election, due
to the fact that his parents were not Burmese citizens at the time of his
birth.
Many more issues will influence the legitimacy and outcome
of the elections. However, the issues mentioned above already bring into
serious question whether this election could ever be seen as free and fair.
It is expected that the NLD will do very well, and probably win a
majority of the votes in parliament, mostly due to the popularity of Aung San
Suu Kyi. However, the NLD has recently come
under fire for excluding Muslims from
its list of candidates, after pressure from nationalist Buddhist groups.
The party also chose
only one out of 17 candidates from the respected ’88 Generation’, including the much loved Ko Ko Gyi who
was one of the movement’s leaders during the 1988 protests, something that produced
widespread consternation and criticism. These actions may make the NLD more
mainstream and may be a move to attract nationalist voters in a bid to secure
an election win. Nevertheless, it puts into serious question the leadership of
Aung San Suu Kyi and the other members of the central committee. It also puts
into question the NLD’s ability to stand up for human rights and to lead the
country into a new and more democratic future.
In a video posted a few days ago, Aung San Suu Kyi urged the international community to observe ‘what happens before the elections, during the elections, and crucially after the elections’. I just hope that this time, any such monitoring will be free of the rose-tinted glasses worn by the international community five years ago. What happens after the election remains to be seen.
No comments:
Post a Comment